1:Sanders Z-5,4 (1952-1959) 1962 EH1 Greece EH1

[The City Greek]

Athenians know more about the French Riviera than the rural regions of their own country, and others of them live so entirely in an urban world that they take the Greek villager for granted, which in many ways is worse than ignoring him.[9] Yet such city Greeks, once this attitude is pointed out to them, are the first to admit their ignorance and to start another discussion on the novel subject of the Greek village, from which so many of them derive.

But there are somber shades as well to the sparkle and dash of Greek wit. To persuade many of the Greek officials to move from talk to action would have its difficulties and would prove particularly frustrating to an American or Britisher who had a special job to complete in a given period of time. It is also probably true that, given the present state of the Greek economy, almost any official is more interested in holding his job than in pressing toward real accomplishment if this might antagonize those above or below him in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Some of these officials, native sons of the village and not yet sure of themselves in the urban environment, spend disproportionate amounts of time in mending their political fences or in sitting on them, a pose easy for many Greeks to assume while rationalizing their problems away.

The qualities of city Greeks which have been mentioned here — self-confidence, intellectual curiosity, philosophizing a problem away, preoccupation with maintaining and improving one's position, and an awareness of a great cultural tradition — are endearing to some while irritating to others.[10] The urban Greeks who seem best to embody the heritage from the past and to approach with sincerity their problems of today are those who have taken time to know both the city and village Greece of the 1960's. Sharing the difficulties faced by their neighbors in the city, they also understand the grave readjustments occurring in the countryside.

The Island and Seafaring Greeks

The tradition of the city, ancient but still tremendously significant today, has mingled with the equally ancient traditions of the sea in the formation of modern Greece. Odysseus still lives in the Aegean and Ionian Islands today, not only in the resourcefulness with which he approached his problems but in the extent of his voyages. The seafarers are primarily the islanders, and Greece has many islands.[11] Although the sea, never more than eighty-odd miles distant from any point in Greece, has an indirect influence on the horizons of all Greeks, it is the direct source of livelihood to many islanders. Whether as fishermen or merchant seamen, they must study its moods in the same way that the city merchant studies the market or the peasant the condition of the soil. The seamen become so cosmopolitan through their voyages that they feel at home in many port towns with people speaking many languages. This at-homeness in the world extends to

2:Friedl E-5 (1955-1959)1963 EH1 Greece EH1
Vasilika

an individual's or family's *filotimo* would be considered severely damaged if they stole from a stranger to whom hospitality had been offered; in fact, such thefts are very rare in any Greek village. Within Vasilika itself, there was some petty filching now and then, but it did not occur on the scale one would have expected from the frequent references to theft and thieving in conversation.

The inhospitality of people in other places was a frequent topic of conversation at the homes of those celebrating name days. A man could always raise a laugh by describing the ludicrously meager food and drink provided at a wedding or name day celebration he had attended at another village. Usually in response to any questions about the occurrence in Vasilika of deviant behavior, or of some form of discord, or of some moral transgression, the villagers began by making a general statement of denial. Such things happened in other villages, they would say, but not in Vasilika.

It would seem from the foregoing that Vasilika's population did, indeed, identify itself with the village as an entity. Vasilika is their *patridha*, and it must be thought to have good qualities, I believe, because the village's qualities reflect on its inhabitants both in their status as individuals and as families. Pride in the village, then, may be an extension of pride in oneself or one's family, and the functional consequences for village-wide enterprises of the existence of such pride depend on the strength of the competing sources of satisfaction.

In Vasilika, since farms may be maintained by the labor of the elementary family with only periodic requirements for a larger labor force, since sons and daughters leave the village and yet maintain relationships with those still in Vasilika, and since individuals can expect to give and to receive protection from their families, the forces leading toward either independence or family solidarity would appear to be strong enough to leave little energy for village-centered activities as a method of augmenting self-esteem. Nevertheless, the village as an entity constitutes a permanent potential source of satisfaction for its inhabitants, and now and then, under certain circumstances, the village itself becomes the primary object of loyalty for its population and commands some sacrifice. The boundary dispute with Parori was such an occasion for Vasilika. Moreover, any individual can, if he wishes, use his energies when he occupies an official position to gain improvements for the village as a means of enhancing his own self-esteem and of gaining the respect of the villagers, as long as he does not do so at the expense of his own children. The people of Vasilika are entirely willing to enjoy and to speak proudly of the electricity, or the piped water, or the better roads in Vasilika, once they have obtained them, even if they are not always willing to work together to achieve the improvements.

But Vasilika, as a village, must compete with another focus of loyalty for its inhabitants besides the family: Greekness itself—and the Greek nation as a political entity. The villagers' awareness of and pride in their Greekness is profound. In 1956 when we were questioning the children as to what they wanted to be when they grew up, several boys answered that they hoped God would let them grow strong and sturdy so that they could be good soldiers and go to "Fight for Cyprus." Moreover, the villagers associate certain qualities with Greek ethnicity: the desire for political independence and the willingness

6: McNeill H-5 (1947, 1956) 1957
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647 in the office concerned, in order to open a door for prompt and
662 courteous service by means of private communication. As a result, a comparatively small number of persons whose social position or family connections gave them an inside track enjoyed a great advantage in dealings with officialdom, while the poor and friendless could hardly regard the government machine as anything but an obstacle between themselves and their legal rights.

647 The idea that officials should be public servants rather than
661 public masters has never been firmly rooted in modern Greece. Byzantine and Turkish tradition, transformed according to Bavarian and then German models, shaped the civil service; and the fact that educated persons regard themselves as elevated far above their ignorant fellows has reinforced and perpetuated the old dichotomy between official and subject.

647 It must be said that the fault has not lain entirely with the
661 civil servants. The ordinary private citizen in Greece is prone
662 to look upon the government as his natural enemy – a group of men who are out to tax him and interfere with what he wants to do. It follows that almost any device to foil the agents of the government is considered legitimate – deceit, lying, bribery or just the exertion of "influence." Indeed, almost all Greeks entertain a kind of admiration for a man who is clever or bold or lucky enough to get around the law and the bureaucracy. Sense of duty to public authorities and laws has never been very strong in the country. More than most nations, the Greeks remain anarchists and individualists at heart; and rather high-handed methods, together with rigid punctiliousness in matters of red tape, is a natural and perhaps almost inevitable official response to such public attitudes.

647 A few segments of the bureaucracy, however, were making
663 serious efforts to serve the public. The most conspicuous of these were the agricultural extension agents, whose contacts
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with the farmers seemed to be genuinely friendly and highly effective in nearly all of the villages I visited. Here again, the American aid mission was entitled to a great deal of credit, for American advisers had made special efforts to reorganize the agricultural extension service on the model of the county agricultural agents in the United States. Many of the Greek agriculturalists had been sent to study in America before receiving their appointments. The public health agencies were another branch of the central administration in which a spirit of service had come to prevail; and there may have been others. In general, it was the older departments of the government, and particularly those concerned with money and taxes, in which the unpleasant but traditional attitudes were most firmly and universally established.

Another administrative change, and one which produced highly beneficial results in some localities at least, was the reinvigoration of local government. During the war and afterward, until 1951, local government officials were appointed through the Ministry of Interior. In 1951, however, local elections were organized, partly at least in response to repeated urging from Americans. As a result of these elections, village presidents and city mayors, together with advisory councils which assisted them in their administration, became more nearly independent of the central government, and commanded, presumably, more local confidence and support than was likely to be the case when the offices were filled by appointment from above.

The system did not always work smoothly – witness Cherasia; but my impression of the local officials whom I met in 1956 was on the whole a quite favorable one. Except in Cherasia, the village presidents seemed to have the full confidence of the villagers, and some of them were men of real intelligence and force of character. The president of Old Corinth would be

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The Political Cosmos

However real the changes which had come in the senior ranks of the civil service and in local government, it remained true that plans for economic development and for most local improvements depended ultimately upon cabinet ministers who held office as politicians and not as economic or any other sort of technicians. Cabinet ministers in turn held their high positions at the pleasure of parliamentary deputies, whose votes depended partly on party affiliations, partly on personal ambition, and partly on calculations of the state of opinion among the electorate.

As in other countries where a managerial bureaucracy does not enjoy unchallenged control of the governmental machine, the issues that have most excited the politicians and the public in Greece have not been questions of economic policy and priority. Everyone is in favor of economic development, everyone is against inflation; everyone is in favor of better salaries and pensions, and everyone is against an unbalanced budget. In other words, political debate is not carried on in responsible economic terms, and a government in office always finds it impossible to live up to wild promises its leaders made in campaign speeches.

This sort of irresponsibility is by no means peculiar to Greece. Most politicians in democratic countries, not least in the United States, behave very similarly. What lends the Greek political world its peculiar character is the nature of the political parties and the irredentist tradition of Greek nationalism.

Political parties in Greece (with the exception of the Communist party) formed in the past around the person of a political leader rather than around a program or around local political machines. The system worked effectively only when an unusually gifted individual appeared on the scene, who, by the

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665 magnetism of his personality, was able to control his followers and keep them faithful to him. Eleftherios Venizelos was able to exert such leadership during parts of his career, though even he was not always successful. General Papagos achieved something similar during the first year or so when he held office, before his failing health raised the question of the succession and induced his followers to start jockeying for position.

645 When no single commanding figure was able to dominate the
662 political scene – and this was normal – then political life became a complicated intrigue among ambitious individuals. Every cabinet spent a lot of energy smoothing over personal frictions within its own ranks, and attempting to block schemes, originating from the outside, to disrupt its following in the Chamber of Deputies. In many instances, these preoccupations
[433] prevented the cabinet from paying more than casual attention
[663] to the really important issues confronting Greece: questions of economic policy, in particular, were often neglected, and awkward decisions, bound to disappoint powerful individuals, were sometimes put off indefinitely.

665 The introduction of the majority system of election in 1952
666 was conceived, both by its Greek advocates and by the United
645 States Embassy, as a promising remedy for this situation. The
[177] effect of the new electoral law was to compel separate personal parties to form election coalitions, since without a coalition no party could hope for a majority if any two others joined forces. But the coalitions did not really destroy the personal parties. Instead, the leaders forming a coalition bargained together to decide how many personal supporters each would be allowed to insert in the coalition's slate of candidates. Questions of the apportionment of cabinet positions and other honorific appointments, to be awarded in the event of victory, were also explored if not always settled in advance. To be sure, Papagos resisted this process and made few promises to the politicians who

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665 ciency, since the more voices that have to reach agreement
645 upon any policy, the more difficult it is to decide anything.
662 Hence the size of Greek cabinets has fluctuated very markedly since World War II, from over twenty-five to less than fifteen members. But even when a cabinet was made unwieldy by the effort to include as many potential supporters as possible, there were always more disappointed than successful candidates; and to such discontented persons it was a standing temptation to break party lines and vote the government down in the Chamber of Deputies on any convenient issue. In the ensuing cabinet reshuffle they might always hope to do better, having proved their indispensability to the government by unseating it.

665 Second, the opposition was always in the position of being
666 able to criticize without suggesting specific and practicable alternatives. It was easy to denounce half measures, to attack policies limited by the availability of money or of physical resources, to criticize the gaps between promises and actual achievements. The fact that much of what was thus attacked could not have been done much differently by anyone in power made little difference, since the opposition was not seriously concerned with what could or could not be done. Most politicians out of office were inclined to feel that any stick with which to beat the government, even a rotten one, was better than silence, so long as the stick hurt.

• [663] The irrelevance of much of the language of political debate to the real, underlying problems of Greek society was easy to criticize from the outside. Yet a sober technical discussion of what the government could and should accomplish, of relative priority among the many desirable projects, and of long-range policies calculated to relieve overpopulation and underemployment lacked all political appeal.

471 The difficulty was that Greece faced a formidable political-
457 psychological problem. If large-scale investment on the basis
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of local resources were to occur, then restriction of current consumption would be necessary. Money and goods would have to be diverted from consumption to capital construction. Without such diversion, the country was condemned to chronic poverty, unless foreign investment and financing came to the rescue. Up to 1956 Greece had indeed depended upon foreign investment for its capital development; but the United States Congress could scarcely be counted upon to continue its support indefinitely. In fact, between 1954 and 1956 it became clear that American aid to Greece was to be shaped by more narrowly conceived American interests, which would mean that military subsidy and the disposal of surplus American agricultural products would take precedence over industrial or any other sort of capital investment in Greece. Moreover, a Greek government that depended upon American bounty would necessarily surrender a large portion of its effective sovereignty, as happened between 1947 and 1952. Such a policy would expose Greek authorities to charges of acting as craven "yes men" to the Americans, and of betraying Greek national interests, as, for instance, in Cyprus.

Dependence upon foreign funds to finance capital development was therefore a poor substitute for financing such development from local resources. Yet no one in Greece wanted to reduce and few wished to restrict the standard of living. The general public was impatient of austerity and wanted an immediate and miraculous increase in consumption levels. The chronic disbalance of the governmental budget reflected (among other factors) the pressure of these demands – demands for higher pensions and salaries, for better unemployment, medical and old-age benefits, and the like. To offer present hardship in the hope of future amelioration of economic conditions was therefore politically unthinkable, even though this was the only program that could really cope with the prob-

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lems Greece confronted. Inflating the currency to pay current running expenses and to finance a modest program of government capital investment proved far more palatable politically, even though such a policy penalized the salaried and wage-earning classes, and led to recurrent crises as the price level outran their incomes.

Greece shares this problem with other underdeveloped nations in which population growth tends to equal or outstrip increases in productivity, while at the same time superficial contact with modern economic ideas has convinced leaders of public opinion that poverty is neither inevitable nor necessary, but can and should be relieved by government action. Under these circumstances, the processes of parliamentary government are most unlikely to turn up politicians who dare to contradict the immediate desire of the electorate for an improvement of living standards. Political irresponsibility toward fundamental economic problems, of a type so widespread in Greece, is a normal and all but inevitable result.

To 1956, at least, the discrepancy between the tenor of political debate and the planning of technicians in the economic ministries of the Greek government seems to have had only slight effect upon the practical realization of economic plans. In some cases, the fact that the minister was so often distracted by the exigencies of the political game may even have given civil servants a freer hand than they might otherwise have had. But if this was so, the major reason for it was the existence of the American aid mission, and the ultimate dependence of most economic advance upon grants from American authorities. That is to say, a senior civil servant, when confronted by his minister, could always point out that if his plans were not approved, then there might be a reckoning with the Americans, whose ideas about how the Greek government should try to shape the economy had much in common with the civil servant's approach, and little with that of the politicians.

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It could almost be said that the Americans, having failed to alter the political pattern of Greece by direct intervention in 1950 and 1951, succeeded in short-circuiting the political process by dealing directly with the rising group of civil servants whose general outlook and whose personal positions in the hierarchy of administration had been profoundly influenced by the aid mission itself. This provided, temporarily at least, a workable substitute for responsible self-government; but it was an essentially fragile structure, depending both on the continuance of American grants to Greece and upon the acquiescence of the politicians.

Signs were not wanting in 1956 that the acquiescence of the politicians could not always be depended upon. Neutralism as between the Soviet Union and the United States had a few public advocates, and several newspapers systematically played up incidents that reflected discredit upon American personnel. There were also repeated newspaper attacks upon the privileged status American officials enjoyed. In the fall of 1955 popular demonstrations of sympathy for the Cypriotes in Athens, Salonika and Patras took a rather violent anti-American turn, including the stoning of American official buildings. Wherever I went in 1956 the inevitable question was put: Why does the United States not live up to its principles and support Greek claims in Cyprus?

In this indirect fashion, the Cyprus question allowed public expression of restiveness against American influence in Greece to assume a politically respectable, i.e., non-Communist, form. Part, though by no means a major part, of the emotional energy behind the Cyprus agitation in Greece reflected resentment against the American leading strings which had controlled Greece so thoroughly for nearly ten years.

Because the Cyprus question offered release for many diverse frustrations and grievances, it attained extraordinary proportions. All other political issues were in almost total eclipse in

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bring about the overthrow of the Karamanlis government and the installation of a cabinet far less inclined to cleave to the western alliance system of NATO in foreign affairs, and far less amenable to American advice concerning home policy.

What the effect of such a change might be upon the development of the economy, or upon the civil servants who were so busily planning its growth, cannot be forecast. My point merely is this: that the divorce between the realm of political discourse in Greece and the real problems of economic and social melioration within the nation is so wide as to be dangerous. Some economically ruinous action, rising from feelings of outraged nationalism, and provoked by politicians who hope to win place and prestige by risking everything on a politico-military gamble, may damage much of what has already been accomplished, or postpone indefinitely the realization of plans which have been laid for future economic expansion.

There are here the makings of a vicious circle. The major cause of the characteristic irresponsibility and extremism of Greek politics in recent decades, I am convinced, has been the chronic discontents and personal frustrations which tens of thousands of white-collar and professional people have felt. For them, politics offers a psychological release from daily difficulty and disappointment. To act as an adequate catharsis, political argument must be exciting, indeed inflammatory. The politicians therefore offer excitement, and when they cannot find it they try to manufacture it. If no internal foe seems sufficiently evil, then attacks are turned against some foreign antagonist. Political instability and changeability are the result, and when words boil over into actions real economic setbacks often follow – setbacks that feed the chronic discontent behind the political manifestations themselves.

Much of the domestic history of modern Greece can be interpreted as the result of such a vicious circle in action. The re-

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433 construction of the economy and the transformation of the civil
662 service since 1947 seem to offer a chance for escape from this
663 circle, but escape is as yet by no means assured.

The Communist Problem

668 The Communist party was declared illegal in October 1947,
669 and has remained illegal since then. Communist party leaders first joined the guerrillas, then retreated with the remnant of the guerrilla army behind the iron curtain. It seems entirely likely that the exile leadership was torn by faction and recrimination. Backwash from the shipwreck of their hopes on the Macedonian issue in 1949 must have continued to distract the secret councils of the party. Equally, the changing winds of doctrine that followed Stalin's death shook the Greek Communist party, and, combined perhaps with other factors, led in the fall of 1956 to the demotion of Nicholas Zachariades and the substitution of an almost unknown personality as Secretary General.

Rather strenuous police measures were taken during the guerrilla war to break up the Communist underground organization. Many people were arrested and several hundred were shot. How effective these measures were in breaking down the party organization cannot be judged by anyone standing outside the inmost party circles. Furthermore, the failure of the guerrilla enterprise, and the collision between Greek national feeling and international Communist policy over the question of the future of Macedonia must have disheartened even the most fanatical Communists in Greece, and certainly discredited Communism in the eyes of many who had formerly been sympathetic.

668 Whether these events mean that the Communist threat to Greece is lastingly removed, or whether the Greek Communist